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2.1  Introduction 
This paper examines the role that taxation has played in the economic de- 
velopment of  eight East Asian economies-Hong  Kong, Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan Province of  China (henceforth, 
referred to as Taiwan), and Thailand. These include four so-called newly in- 
dustrialized countries (Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan), two oil 
exporters (Indonesia and Malaysia), and the Philippines and Thailand.  Much 
has been written on the tax systems of these countries, but a perusal of  the 
literature indicates that  it  is  difficult to  identify the  role  that  taxation has 
played in the development of these economies.2 Indeed, the papers tend to 
focus more on the need to reform the existing tax systems than on the role that 
these systems may have played. 
Vito Tanzi is director of the Fiscal Affairs Department of the International Monetary Fund and 
president of the International Institute of Public Finance. Parthasarathi Shome is division chief of 
the Tax Policy Division, Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund. 
This research paper is based on secondary sources. It does not necessarily reflect the official 
position of the International Monetary Fund and represents solely the views of the authors. The 
authors would like to thank Takatoshi Ito, Hitotsubashi University; Joseph Y.  Lim, University of 
the Philippines; John Whalley, University of Western Ontario; Susan Schadler, International Mon- 
etary Fund; and an anonymous referee for comments and discussions that were very helpful in the 
finalization of the paper. 
I. In this paper, the term country is used synonymously with economy. No legal significance 
should be attached to the use of this term. 
2. For comparative studies, see Shome (1986). The most exhaustive set of recent papers was 
presented at a January  1990 symposium, “Tax Policy and Economic Development among Pacific 
Asian Countries,” Institute for Social Sciences and Philosophy, Taipei. Of particular interest were 
the papers by  Asher, Salih, and Salleh (Malaysia); Gillis (Indonesia); Kim and Lee (Korea); Lee 
(Korea); Richupan (Thailand); and Sicat (the Philippines). A February 1990 conference, “Fiscal 
System of  Singapore: Trends, Issues,  and Future Directions,” offers another interesting set of 
papers, of  particular relevance being Asher’s paper on the fiscal system in an international per- 
spective. See also Riew (1988) on Taiwan, and Asher (1989) on all the sample countries, includ- 
ing Hong Kong. 
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This paper has two distinct parts.  Section 2.2 provides an informal sum- 
mary of the main features of the tax systems of  these countries that may have 
played a role in their economic development, with the objective of highlight- 
ing the major differences among the countries. In a way, this part looks at the 
past  experiences of  these countries  to see whether  any  conclusions  can be 
derived from them.  Section 2.2 also includes a more forward-looking  part 
that, after commenting on recent changes, assesses the direction that tax re- 
form should take to increase the usefulness of the tax system as an instrument 
for development.  Section  2.3 is a more speculative section that attempts to 
draw some lessons and some conclusions from the experiences of  these coun- 
tries. 
2.2  Tax  Structures, Tax Reform, and the Development of 
East Asian Economies 
This section highlights some characteristics of  the tax structures in the var- 
ious  sample countries, as well  as  major  features of  recent  tax  reform  that 
might have helped or hindered their economic development. We will deal with 
three subgroups:  (1) the newly industrialized countries (NICS);~  (2) the two 
oil exporters; and (3) Thailand and the Philippines. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 will be 
used for reference. 
2.2.1  Taiwan 
General Characteristics 
Taiwan’s development strategy has been characterized by  (1) a high saving 
rate, matched by appropriate interest rate policies; (2) an export orientation, 
supported by an appropriate exchange rate policy and by rapid industrializa- 
tion financed by the high saving rate; and (3) an awareness of equity consid- 
erations as revealed by its land reform program, by  the system of property 
taxation, and by the fact that this is the only country that seems to have gen- 
erated official annual surveys of income distribution. 
Having grown to about 20 percent in the early 1980s, the tax/GDP ratio fell 
back to about 15 percent by the late 1980s; such a level is now well below the 
world average especially for countries at Taiwan’s level of  economic develop- 
ment. Nevertheless,  given the limited range of activities by the public sector 
and good public expenditure management, public revenue has been sufficient 
to meet the country’s expenditure needs.  Fiscal deficits were not allowed to 
develop, and revenue generation, per se, never became a major concern of the 
tax  system. Thus, Taiwan did not experience the fiscally caused macroeco- 
nomic problems that have characterized many other countries. 
Subnational taxes are important revenue sources, accounting for 45 percent 
3. For  a comprehensive analysis of  the increasing economic maturity of  the four NICs, see 
Banque Indosuez (1990). Table 2.1  Sample Asian Countries: Tax Revenue by Qpe  of Tax (in percentage of total tax revenue) 
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Sources: International Monetary Fund; Asher (1900) for Taiwan and Hong Kong. 
”The composition of the various taxes should be used as broad indicators. 
bAssumed  proportions from Asher (1990). Table 2.2  Sample Asian Economies: Selected Tax Characteristics 
Taiwan  Hong Kong  Korea  Singapore  Indonesia  Malaysia  Thailand  Philippines 
Maximum corporate in-  25  16.5  3Y  33  35  40  35  35 
Maximum personal in-  w  15  50”  33  35  40  55  35 
Treatment of capital gainsc  S  E  S  E  S  E  S  S 
come tax rate (%) 
come tax rate (%) 
Withholding taxes 
Dividend  20  -  10  -  20  -  20  35 
Interest  20  -  10  33  20  20  25  20 
Tax incentives  Important  Small  Important  Important  None  Important  Important  Important 
Basic sales tax/VAT rate  5  None  10  None  0-35  5-10  0.5-10  10 
Property taxes  High  Basedon  LOW  High  Low  None  LOW  LOW 
rent 
Sources: MIER 1989, and updated information from national sources. 
‘If defense and inheritance surcharges are included, the effective corporate tax rate would be 42 percent and the top personal income 
tax rate would be 64  percent. 
bReduced from 50 percent in  1990. 
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of  total  tax  revenue.  They have  strong  implications  for intragovernmental 
transfers; thus, studies on the Taiwanese tax system have tended to analyze 
both national and regional taxes (Riew  1988; Asher 1989). Of the tax com- 
position presented in table 2.1, the national government collects customs du- 
ties,  selected commodity taxes, personal  income tax, and business  income 
tax-there  is no payroll tax-while  the subnational governments levy mo- 
nopoly charges on tobacco and wine (10 percent, of which the national gov- 
ernment gets the lion’s share at 6.5 percent),  land-related taxes, and a flat 5 
percent value-added tax, called the business tax. 
Role of  Selected Important Characteristics of  Tax Policy 
Incentives to Save and Invest. The fact that income taxes have not contributed 
significantly  to tax revenue reflects  the tax  incentives given through the in- 
come tax system. Until 1981, there was an unlimited exclusion of both inter- 
est and dividend  earnings from personal  income taxation,  at which  time a 
ceiling was imposed (beyond which they would be taxed at a flat rate). Capital 
gains were exempt until  1989 (when a threshold was introduced that affects 
only large investors), thereby increasing the effective after-tax rate of return 
on capital. Expenditure allowances are relatively small, with no deductibility 
of interest on consumer loans and limited deductibility on mortgage loans. 
It has been argued that such incentives to save and invest coupled with a 
lack of any tax-induced encouragement to spend have had a significant impact 
on the high savings performance of the economy; they also have helped to 
expand the corporate sector and to develop the capital market. 
Investment  incentives are also provided  within  the Statute for Promoting 
Investment (SPI), which applies to a wide range of “productive” enterprises4 
that are liable to the business  income tax. Under the SPI, all research  and 
development expenditures are immediately deductible.  A five-year tax holi- 
day  or accelerated  depreciation  is provided  for new  and  expanding  enter- 
prises, with additional preferences for “capital or technology-intensive” enter- 
prises,  together  with  a  20  percent  effective  tax  rate  ceiling  (including 
surcharges) on “important” enterprises in basic metals, heavy machinery, and 
petrochemicals,  and an additional tax credit worth 5-20  percent of investment 
in capital stock in “strategic” enterprises  as determined by the government. 
Finally,  mergers are encouraged by exempting the dissolved enterprise  and 
providing a two-year,  15 percent tax credit to the merged enterprise. In sum, 
Taiwan has had a very finely tuned tax incentives scheme with the objective 
of rapid industrialization. 
Land-based Taxes. Perhaps  the most distinguishing  feature of  Taiwan’s tax 
structure among the sample countries has been its ability to tap property val- 
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ues-land  as well as structures-as  a significant source of revenue, a charac- 
teristic shared with Singapore. There are three main taxes: the land value tax 
(LVT), the land value increment tax (LVIT), and the house tax. Without going 
into the details of the individual tax structures, suffice it to say that the LVT is 
comparable to the property taxes of most other countries, that is, it is based 
on the assessed value of residential and industrial urban land. As might not be 
too surprising, its share in tax revenue has declined over time-from  4 percent 
in 1980 to 2 percent in 1987. Neither does the house tax, which is levied on 
the value of construction, generate much in terms of revenue. 
The uniqueness lies in Taiwan’s successful implementation of the LVIT on 
the net increment to the transfer value of land, levied at the rate of 40 percent 
on the first 100 percent increase, 50 percent on the next 100 percent, and a top 
rate of 60  percent. This is a kind of benefit-received tax, since the increase in 
the land value is assumed to reflect the growth of the economy and the provi- 
sion of public services. Land is probably the main beneficiary of public spend- 
ing on infrastructures.  Apart from being a significant revenue generator, the 
tax is likely to have contained land speculation, raised regional autonomy, and 
improved the equity of the tax system. 
In a country where income tax revenue is not high (in contrast to Hong 
Kong and Singapore), a relatively high contribution from property taxes has 
maintained  the level of  public revenue  at an  adequate  level  in spite of  the 
granting of wide-ranging incentives from the income tax base. In a way, the 
land taxes have paid for the investment incentives. Also, in an environment of 
high savings and large trade surpluses there could be an incentive toward spec- 
ulative investments, especially in the form of landholdings. LVIT discourages 
such investments and redirects financial resources toward more productive in- 
vestments for which tax incentives are given. 
The LVIT has been a much-needed instrument to counter the probable neg- 
ative effect on the income distribution of the various savings incentives, the 
relatively  small  capital  gains  tax,  and  the  special  incentives  for  capital- 
intensive investment. The growth of LVIT revenues implies a rising share of 
subnational tax  revenue  in overall tax revenue and, consequently,  a greater 
decentralization of the fiscal sector, bringing with it a more balanced regional 
development. 
Customs Duties. In the early stages of development,  customs duties usually 
account  for a major share of  tax  revenue.  This was the case in Taiwan.  If 
growth and development proceed on the right path, the advantages of an open 
economy eventually become more apparent,  thus leading to a decline in the 
share of customs duties. This has occurred  in Taiwan; however, one is sur- 
prised that, in spite of its success as an international competitor, customs du- 
ties still remain important-their  tax share declining rather slowly, from 24 
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Tax Reform for Development 
Strongly relying on a system of tax incentives to promote industry-led ex- 
ports, Taiwan has felt the need neither to globalize income taxes nor to curtail 
significantly  its  incentives  structures. This is not  to say  that  it completely 
overlooked the need for tax reform or that it did not initiate some reforms. 
Reform measures were taken in  1986 when the value-added  tax  (VAT) was 
introduced and the top marginal personal income tax rate was reduced from 
60  percent to 50 percent; in 1988 when the top business income tax rate was 
reduced  from 35 percent  to 25 percent;  and in  1990 when the top personal 
income tax rate was reduced further to 40 percent. Thus direct taxes followed 
the international trend toward the lowering of marginal tax rates. 
The most important reform action was perhaps the introduction of  the con- 
sumption-based VAT with the dual objectives of reducing the distortions cre- 
ated by the existing commodity taxes and, as an added incentive to export, 
eliminating exports and capital goods from the tax base. Revenue generation 
was not an objective, and the VAT was introduced on a revenue-neutral basis 
at a single 5 percent rate. Therefore, while the schedular direct tax structure 
together with its multifaceted incentives schemes is still considered important 
to promote growth, the multirated commodity taxes were perceived as distor- 
tionary and were replaced by a VAT. 
Taiwan has not had fiscal deficits; its direct tax and incentives system seems 
geared for its industry-led,  export-oriented growth path that has certainly ma- 
terialized;  it has substituted  the reduced role of  direct taxes with increased 
land taxation; it has substituted a generalized VAT  for distortionary domestic 
consumption taxes; and in answer to a large trade surplus, it has been reducing 
its customs tariffs (even though they still remain high). On the face of it, thus, 
taxation may have played  a positive role in Taiwan’s development.  The tax 
structure that accompanied that growth reflected the philosophy of the 1960s 
and  1970s based  on  fine-tuning  tax  incentives  and  disincentives.  Taiwan 
shows no particular inclination to move away from it and, given the success 
of its economy, it is easy to understand why. 
There are some aspects of taxation that Taiwan probably cannot neglect in 
the future as its economy matures and enters the next stage of development. 
First, the complete absence of payroll/social security taxation will need to be 
replaced by some form of contribution system that addresses the issue of so- 
cial insurance and social security. Second, pollution taxes will possibly have 
to  be introduced to ameliorate environmental  deterioration.  Third, the levels 
of customs tariffs will have to be reduced, especially in view of Taiwan’s large 
trade surplus. Finally, the large trade surplus may lead to strong reactions by 
other countries and force Taiwan to reassess its incentive policy  toward ex- 
ports. 38  Vito Tanzi and Parthasarathi Shome 
2.2.2  Hong Kong 
General Characteristics 
Among the sample countries, Hong Kong’s average tax level has been the 
smallest (together with the Philippines), though the tax/GDP ratio increased 
from around 9 percent in  1975 to 10 percent in 1980 and reached almost 12 
percent by  1987 (Ho  1989). Revenues have been  sufficient to meet public 
expenditure so that revenue generation has not been an objective requiring 
particular attention. The relative importance of direct taxes in total tax reve- 
nues has risen from the 52-54  percent range in 1974-76 to the 55-59  percent 
range in 1985-87. 
Selected Distinguishing  Features 
Aspects relevant to development are the low tax level and the resilience of 
the tax structure itself. The main tax-the  earnings and profits tax (Em)- 
has remained basically unchanged since the mid- 1950s, thereby imparting a 
stable tax environment for business operations. This has removed an impor- 
tant factor-tax  uncertainty-that  in other countries plays a role in reducing 
the incentive to invest. 
Overall Tax Levels. The “standard” tax rate and the corporate tax rate of the 
EPT are low and result in low overall tax levels. Between 1975 and 1984, the 
standard tax rate was 15 percent; it rose to 17 percent in 1986 but was steadily 
brought back to 15 percent by  1989. Similar modifications apply to the cor- 
porate tax, the corresponding rates being 16.5 percent, 18.5 percent, and 16.5 
percent. As a consequence of these low rates, the authorities have felt no need 
to  grant tax incentives. However, depreciation allowances are quite liberal 
with high initial allowances, inventory valuation is on market-value basis, the 
nominal value of  interest payments is deductible, and losses can be carried 
forward for an indefinite period of time. There are no taxes on dividends or 
capital gains, even at the personal level, and a tax on interest income was 
eliminated in 1989. 
Indirect taxes are not high either. Import duties and excises which tend to 
be levied on a specific basis-resulting  in low elasticities with respect to GDP 
growth-have  fallen in terms of  GDP from around 2 percent in  1970 to 1.5 
percent in the mid-1970s and 1 percent in 1986. The dutiable commodities are 
few and include tobacco,  alcoholic and nonalcoholic beverages, cosmetics, 
and hydrocarbon oils. Other indirect taxes are also selective and are levied on 
usually accepted sumptuary bases-bets  and sweeps tax, entertainment tax, 
hotel accommodation tax, stamp duties, airport departure and harbor passage 
tax, and motor vehicles tax. In sum, the role of tax policy in the development 
strategy of Hong Kong has consisted in maintaining an environment of  low 
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by  a policy of low government expenditure and taxation. It is not difficult to 
see why  Hong Kong has been  seen as the best example of  a supply-side- 
oriented fiscal policy. 
Resilience of the Tax Structure. Hong Kong’s tax structure has remained rela- 
tively unchanged since the 1950s. The EFT, its direct tax umbrella, is a sched- 
ular system comprising salaries (after various forms of personal allowances), 
profits (both noncorporate and corporate), property (only rent is taxed), and 
interest (abolished in 1989). Different tax rates apply to each component. The 
fact that the bases remained more or less unchanged while the rates changed 
very little and remained very low by  international standards over three dec- 
ades is possibly the most important distinguishing feature of Hong Kong’s tax 
system. If  the tax system played a role in attracting and maintaining a high 
level of investment and in promoting growth, it must have been due to that 
feature. 
Tax Reform 
In its continuous endeavor to encourage efficiency and growth Hong Kong 
introduced a major change in its tax structure in 1989 by abolishing its tax on 
interest income, thus equating it, for tax purposes, to the untaxed dividends 
and capital gains. To  a large extent, therefore, the tax base moved closer to 
consumption. 
Hong Kong’s main preoccupation for its future development is its tax struc- 
ture after 1997. Several authors have suggested possible tax reforms in view 
of  the forthcoming change.  Asher (1989) has recommended increasing the 
base of  indirect taxes rather than raising EPT rates at a time when the econ- 
omy might be expected to undergo a recession. The 1988 Budget Speech also 
recommends a sales tax in the medium term. The Draft Basic Law for after 
1997 emphasizes the continuation of  a free port, low taxation, and balanced 
budgets. A related concern is the possible extension to Hong Kong of China’s 
tax treaties with third countries. 
To  conclude,  Hong  Kong ’s  future development comprises unique chal- 
lenges. While its tax structure has remained viable for many years, the emerg- 
ing circumstances are likely to oblige Hong Kong to introduce major modifi- 
cations. Some of  these modifications would inevitably raise the tax level. It 
must be recalled that the tax level of China is now about 20 percent of its GDP. 
It does not seem likely that Hong Kong would have the luxury of maintaining 
its present unusually low ratio. 
2.2.3  Korea 
Structural Characteristics 
Korea’s history of rapid GDP growth begs the question as to whether and 
to what extent that growth was supported by  its tax policies. A glance at Ko- 40  Vito Tanzi and Parthasarathi Shome 
rea’s tax shares indicates that taxes on domestic goods and services yield al- 
most half  of total  tax revenue, income taxes less than a third, and customs 
duties almost a fifth. Social security and property taxes contribute little. Tax 
shares have remained  more or less stable since the mid-1970s in the face of 
various tax reforms. 
Korea’s tax structure has been changed many times since the 1960s in order 
to raise the elasticity of the tax system by increasing the share of broad-based, 
domestic  indirect  taxes  and  in  order to promote  specific  objectives.  This 
change accompanied  the reduction in foreign trade taxes and the granting of 
wide-ranging tax incentives from corporate income taxes. The objective was 
the promotion of export-oriented  industrialization-a  strategy similar to that 
of Taiwan.5 By contrast personal incomes continued to be taxed at high rates 
(the 70 percent top marginal rate, which was reduced only in  1989, was not 
only the highest in our sample, but was high by world standards-see  table 
2.2-and  continues to be one of  the highest in our sample). Furthermore, it 
yielded about a sixth of tax revenues (table 2.1)-the  second highest propor- 
tion within the sample (after Hong Kong). 
Selected Distinguishing Features 
Among the distinguishing features of Korea’s tax system are (1) the earliest 
introduction-among  the sample countries-of  a VAT  in 1977; (2) the strong 
role given to tax incentives; (3) an early recognition of  the important role of 
tax administration in revenue performance;  and (4) a tax reform process that 
has been almost uninterrupted  over the years as a part of what seems to be a 
policy of perennial  fine tuning of  the tax  system to promote specific objec- 
tives. These aspects are discussed below. 
The VAT  has become the single largest contributor-at  well over a lifth- 
to total  tax  revenue  and has functioned  remarkably  well  with little change 
since its introduction in  1977. It is levied at a single rate of  10 percent and 
generates over 4 percent of GDP, which is a very good yield for such a low 
rate. By providing the needed revenue, Korea’s early introduction of the VAT 
enabled the country to grant generous tax incentives geared toward its indus- 
trialization and export strategy. In this sense, Korea’s VAT  played a similar 
accommodative role as Taiwan’s land-based taxes. 
Until recently tax incentives had been assumed to have played an important 
role in Korea’s economic development. Embodied in the Tax Exemption and 
Reduction Control Law (TERCL), they include investment tax credits, special 
depreciation, tax-free reserves, and liberal expensing from taxable income, in 
addition to the usual deductions. On the other hand, the rules for foreign di- 
rect  investment  have  always  been  restrictive.  Until  the  mid-l980s,  foreign 
investment  was allowed  only for “beneficial”  activities.  Thus, even  with  a 
doubling of “arrived” direct foreign investment of U.S. $477 million in 1986 
from $236 million in  1985, and reaching  $626 million and $894 million in 
5. Many incentives were aimed at increasing exports. See Kwack (1990) 41  Taxation and Development in East Asian Countries 
1987 and 1988, respectively, it still represents only around 3 percent of GDP. 
The uniqueness of  Korea’s tax  incentives policy, therefore lies in its being 
tailored toward  domestic industrial development, exports,  and  technology 
transfer, rather than toward foreign investment. 
Recently several Korean studies have begun to question both the effective- 
ness of  those incentives and their equity implications. Several authors have 
concluded that these tax incentives have been overgenerous, leading to unnec- 
essary revenue loss6 and have led to inequities (Kim and Lee 1990; Kwack 
1990). Lee (1  990) strongly condemns the growth-orientation of the economy 
at a cost to a more balanced development path that would accommodate social 
objectives. He is of the opinion that “Korea’s fiscal policy has played a weak 
and passive role and thus failed to fulfill necessary social needs” (3). He sup- 
ports his argument with an international comparison of  income distribution.’ 
Now  that Korea-like  Taiwan-has  emerged as a “growth tiger,” it is begin- 
ning to give increasing weight to the objective of equitable income distribu- 
tion, an objective that had not received a lot of attention in the past. Of course, 
the overall standard of living of  Koreans has improved enormously with the 
achievement of sustained high rates of growth. 
Among the sample countries, Korea may have been the forerunner in rec- 
ognizing the importance of tax administration. The Office  of  National Tax 
Administration (ONTA), created in 1966, appears to have been quite success- 
ful in raising the tax/GDP ratio by  4 percentage points between  1966 and 
1970. This office has carried a lot of  power over the years. Indeed, some 
researchers are of the opinion that the role of tax administration has been more 
important than that of tax policy in determining Korea’s revenue performance 
over the past three decades. However, several Korean participants at this con- 
ference commented on the increasing incidence of  tax evasion and avoidance 
in Korea in recent years, thereby exacerbating the adverse distributional con- 
sequences of the tax system. 
Tax Reform 
A quotation pertaining to Korea from Asher (1989, 54)  seems appropriate: 
“Tax reform is almost continuous. Major tax reforms were undertaken in 9 out 
of the 33 years between 1953 and 1986. Choi and Lee (1987) also report that 
in 7 of those 9 years, the changes were substantial enough to be labeled ‘com- 
prehensive.’ ” Tax  policy changes have continued since 1986 with reduction 
in  the top personal income tax rate and in the number of brackets, together 
with greater relief to lower brackets and wider globalization in the tax struc- 
ture. 
Despite the above changes, the greatest pressure on Korea’s future tax re- 
6. It should be noted that the corporate tax generated only a little more than 2 percent of GDP 
in 1986-88.  Unpublished data indicate that in 1980 tax incentives reduced the corporate income 
tax base by two-thirds. 
7. Kwack’s conclusion is that “the tax incentives to promote exports have played only minor 
roles in Korea’s export-oriented development process” (1990, 18). 42  Vito Tanzi and Parthasarathi Shorne 
form reflects its heightened concern toward income redistribution (Sixth Five- 
Year  Plan,  1987-91).  Such a concern will  inevitably  be reflected in higher 
social spending and in higher taxes. First, to provide nationwide medical in- 
surance and a pension scheme, the payroll tax is slated for increase. Second, 
a punitive  tax on the increased value of land  (similar to Taiwan’s LVIT) is 
planned  in order to curb speculative forces as well as for reasons of  equity. 
Speculators holding land zoned for housing development will pay a 50 percent 
tax on the increase in the annual value of the land; urban property in excess of 
700 square meters will face high tax rates; and the rating system will be re- 
vised to reflect property values rather than the building cost. This is to directly 
redress to some extent the adverse situation of 70 percent of families in major 
urban  areas that do not own any property. Third, currently allowable false- 
name  stock  accounts will  be  transformed  to real-name  accounts and  made 
subject to capital gains tax. Similarly, in anticipation of a more advanced so- 
ciety, authors have  also cited the need that “fiscal policy  should be geared 
toward  establishing  medium-  and  long-term  antipollution  measures”  (Lee 
1990, 14). 
Korea has extensively used tariff and nontariff barriers to control imports, 
though with a steady relaxation  over recent years that has brought down the 
average tariff rate. With a burgeoning trade surplus a quicker liberalization of 
trade would be desirable-as  in Taiwan. Interestingly, trade liberalization, so 
far, has apparently allowed greater luxury imports and, therefore, a notion of 
ostentatious consumption  and  at least a perception  of  increased  inequities. 
Large differences in consumption patterns seem less socially acceptable than 
large differences in incomes. As a consequence the issue of income distribu- 
tion has been brought to the forefront. Also, the benefits from export incen- 
tives are being questioned.  It is likely that these incentives will be reduced if 
not eliminated in future years. 
2.2.4  Singapore 
Structural Characteristics 
Singapore is the fourth of the sample economies that selected a develop- 
ment strategy  based primarily on advanced  technology  and oriented toward 
exports. Public revenues have been adequate to meet its expenditure needs; 
thus revenue increase has not been an explicit concern of tax policy. Instead, 
tax incentives,  fine-tuned  for the purpose of generating rapid growth in se- 
lected sectors,  have played as important a role in Singapore’s tax policy as 
they were intended to play in Taiwan and Korea. 
Yet  Singapore, like Hong Kong but unlike Taiwan, has continued to draw a 
major  share  of  its  tax  revenue-40-45  percent-from  income  taxes,  and 
two-thirds of this share from the corporate tax. On the other hand, like Taiwan 
but unlike Hong Kong,  it relies relatively  heavily on property  taxes, which 
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both income and property taxes, the contribution of customs duties and con- 
sumption taxes has been limited-about  a third of total tax revenue. 
Selected Distinguishing Features 
Among the distinguishing features of  Singapore’s tax system is the large 
number of personal income tax brackets. Thus, Singapore has not followed 
the current trend toward broad, low-rate taxation with few brackets. Singa- 
pore has aimed at as broad a participation as possible by potential taxpayers 
in an effort to raise their tax consciousness. In 1987, for example, about two- 
thirds of  the taxpayers had  assessed income of  below s. $15,000 and  ac- 
counted for only 8 percent of the tax assessed (Asher 1990, 15). 
Possibly the most striking feature of  Singapore, a feature that sets it apart 
from the other countries in the sample, is its interventionist policy affecting 
social security provision. Provident fund contributions that amount to about a 
third  of  gross  wages,  including  employer  contributions,  are  tax-exempt. 
While this narrows the tax base, Singapore’s social security needs are being 
met through a funded rather than a pay-as-you-go principle of social insurance 
and without resorting to financing through budgetary sources. As Singapore 
grows into an industrialized economy, the same questions being asked in Ko- 
rea and Taiwan are being raised in Singapore: Should the government expand 
its role in providing social insurance through the budget? Does the govern- 
ment have responsibility in this regard as the nation matures? What should not 
be overlooked, however, is the past management by  government in the suc- 
cessful provision of housing to the majority of the population through loans 
drawn on the Central Provident Fund, an achievement not claimed by Taiwan, 
Korea, and Hong Kong . 
Singapore is not different from Taiwan or Korea in its explicit and forceful 
use of income tax incentives for promoting industrial policies. As mentioned 
above, it has used them also as an instrument for its social policies (i.e., de- 
ductions of provident fund contributions) as well as for the retention of local 
and foreign professional work forces. Like Hong Kong, Singapore has used 
tax  incentives to promote its financial policies by  exempting capital gains 
from taxation altogether. 
Tax Reform 
As Singapore matures further, what role can taxation be expected to play? 
Perhaps Singapore should move toward a uniform, broader-based system of 
taxation. While the 1986 Report of the Economic Committee of the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry recommended phasing out selective fiscal incentives 
and moving to a uniform, low corporate and personal income tax structure as 
a long-term goal-a  move that would take Singapore in the direction of Hong 
Kong-it  also called for additional incentives in the immediate future, for 
example, a 30 percent initial allowance for all investment (this would, of 
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in Taiwan, Singapore has not effectively questioned the continued role of tax 
incentives in the near term. 
Similarly, while the share of revenue from domestic consumption taxes has 
increased  in the late  1980s, interest  in  a broad-based  VAT  remains  slight, 
especially in an environment in which neither private savings nor overall tax 
revenue are considered  low, though Singapore has been studying the advan- 
tages of eventually introducing a VAT.  In any case, the economy of Singapore 
is, perhaps,  organized enough to render feasible a retail sales tax instead of 
a VAT. 
The primary area where Singapore could seriously consider tax reform, at 
its present stage of  development, is in a reintroduction of  the payroll tax for 
the budgetary financing of social insurance. The Economic Committee’s rec- 
ommendation for a property tax decrease, effective in 1990, would also have 
a revenue impact  and would  possibly require  some fine-tuning  in other tax 
revenue sources. 
2.2.5  Malaysia 
Structural Characteristics 
Malaysia  is the  first of  the  non-NICs  in our sample, and its tax  history 
exhibits their common concern regarding revenue generation. Like Indonesia, 
it is a petroleum exporter and has had a similar problem of  trying to raise the 
share of nonpetroleum revenues in the presence of  present or expected reduc- 
tion  in oil revenues.  It has experienced  large fiscal deficits  throughout  the 
1980s and has accumulated considerable foreign debt. Table 2.3 presents, for 
available  sample countries, the movements over time of  tax/GDP ratios.  It 
shows how in the 1980s Malaysia’s tax/GDP ratio fell steadily, with the rela- 
tive decline in nonoil tax revenue being even greater. This fall in revenue has 
forced a large reduction in public spending in recent years. 
Various causes may be cited for the decline in revenue. First, tax incentives 
have grown to include “investment, export, reinvestment, research and devel- 
opment, labor utilization,  manpower  training,  location,  and others” (Asher, 
Salih, and Salleh  1990, 11). The inevitable result has been a fall in the cor- 
porate income tax/GDP ratio. Second, despite a doubling of the sales tax rate 
from 5 percent  to  10 percent  in  1983, revenue from this  tax  has declined 
slightly in terms of GDP as a result of the progressive erosion of the tax base.s 
Similarly, the excise tax/GDP ratio has stagnated because many of the taxed 
items have  been  removed, leaving only traditional  excisable  items-petro- 
leum, tobacco, alcohol, and motor vehicles. Third, taxes on exports have de- 
clined by about 3 percentage  points of GDP between  1978 and  1988, while 
customs duties have declined by  1 percentage point.  Finally, despite the use 
8. The Malaysian Institute of  Economic Research (MIER) has estimated that, up to 1987, 75 
percent of domestic manufacturing output was exempt from the tax base. Some of the exemptions 
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Table 2.3  Tax GDP Ratio of Sample Asian Countries (time series) 
1978-80  1979-81  1980-82  1981-83  1982-84  1983-85  1984-86  1985-87  1986-88 
Singapore  16.81 
Korea  15.39 
Malaysia  21.69 
Thailand  12.42 
Philippines  11.66 
Indonesia  19.99 
Singapore  7.48 
Korea  4.22 
Malaysia  8.72 
Thailand  2.45 
Philippines  2.8 1 
Indonesia  15.48 
Singapore  n.a. 
Korea  2.16 
Malaysia  2.11 
Thailand  1.07 
Philippines  1.52 
Indonesia  0.45 
Singapore  n.a. 
Korea  2.05 
Malaysia  6.61 
Thailand  1.38 
Philippines  1.30 
Indonesia  14.06 
Singapore  n.a. 
Korea  0.00 
Malaysia  0.01 
Thailand  0.00 
Philippines  0.00 
Indonesia  0.96 
Singapore  3.9  1 
Korea  7.62 
Malaysia  4.65 
Thailand  6.20 
Philippines  5.35 
































Total Tax Revenue 
18.56  19.20  19.17  18.10 
15.56  15.72  15.64  15.40 
22.46  22.24  21.84  22.28 
12.91  13.44  13.87  14.29 
10.58  10.18  9.83  9.85 
20.44  19.13  17.99  17.72 
Tares on Income 
9.25  9.73  9.50  8.59 
4.14  4.18  4.12  4.11 
9.88  10.06  10.03  10.59 
2.73  2.89  3.04  3.15 
2.55  2.40  2.31  2.50 
16.93  15.87  14.82  14.19 
Individual Income Taxes 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
2.14  2.21  2.18  2.19 
1.97  2.22  2.42  2.44 
1.17  1.33  1.54  1.71 
1.23  1.13  0.97  0.91 
0.39  0.44  0.49  0.57 
Corporate Taxes 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
1.99  1.97  1.94  1.92 
7.91  7.84  7.62  8.15 
1.55  1.56  1.50  1.44 
1.35  1.29  1.31  1.38 
15.58  14.52  13.62  13.18 
Taxes on Income-Other 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.00  0.00  0.04  0.22 
0.96  0.91  0.70  0.44 
Domestic Taxes on Goods and Services 
3.90  3.87  3.87  3.97  3.93 
7.89  8.08  8.09  8.00  7.76 
4.38  4.32  4.61  4.79  4.94 
6.40  6.60  7.10  7.32  7.46 
5.34  4.93  4.61  4.21  4.06 
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Table 2.3  (Continued) 
1978-80  1979-81  1980-82  1981-83  1982-84  1983-85  1984-86  1985-87  1986-88 
Singapore  0.00 
Korea  3.60 
Malaysia  1.23 
Thailand  2.67 
Philippines  1.79 
Indonesia  1.19 
Singapore  1.47 
Korea  2.63 
Malaysia  2.09 
Thailand  2.56 
Philippines  2.75 
Indonesia  1.03 
Singapore  2.44 
Korea  1.39 
Malaysia  1.34 
Thailand  0.97 
Philippines  0.81 
Indonesia  0.00 
Singapore  1.86 
Korea  2.92 
Malaysia  7.83 
Thailand  3.49 
Philippines  3.1  1 
Indonesia  1.96 
Singapore  1.86 
Korea  2.92 
Malaysia  3.56 
Thailand  2.92 
Philippines  2.86 
Indonesia  1.09 
Singapore  0.00 
Korea  0.00 
Malaysia  4.28 
Thailand  0.58 
Philippines  0.25 
Indonesia  0.87 
(continued) 
Taxes on General Sales, Turnover, VAT 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
3.71  3.84  3.89  3.86  3.77 
1.25  1.28  1.46  1.59  1.70 
2.63  2.64  2.69  2.81  2.88 
1.72  1.65  1.56  1.29  1.06 
0.99  1.02  1.04  1.06  1.48 
Taxes on Excises 
1.41  1.36  1.37  1.47  1.53 
2.67  2.55  2.44  2.36  2.32 
1.86  1.71  1.75  1.81  1.85 
2.85  3.16  3.57  3.78  3.86 
2.60  2.27  2.06  1.99  2.11 
0.97  0.96  0.98  0.99  0.98 

























2.51  2.50  2.50  2.40 
1.69  1.77  1.78  1.66 
1.32  1.40  1.39  1.39 
0.80  0.83  0.73  0.72 
1.01  1.00  0.93  0.90 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Taxes on Foreign Trade 
1.57  1.45  1.40 
2.53  2.58  2.63 
7.63  6.87  6.29 
3.32  3.18  3.21 
2.78  2.80  2.97 
1.26  0.99  0.84 
Taxes on Imports 
1.57  1.45  1.40 
2.53  2.58  2.63 
3.83  3.77  3.60 
2.66  2.67  2.79 
2.65  2.70  2.77 
0.91  0.82  0.71 
Taxes on Exports 
0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.00  0.00  0.00 
3.80  3.10  2.69 
0.66  0.51  0.41 
0.12  0.09  0.16 
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Table 2.3  (Continued) 
1978-80  1979-81  1980-82  1981-83  1982-84  1983-85  1984-86  1985-87  1986-88 
Singapore  0.00 
Korea  0.00 
Malaysia  0.00 
Thailand  0.00 
Philippines  0.01 
Indonesia  0.00 
Singapore  0.00 
Korea  0.18 
Malaysia  0.10 
Thailand  0.00 
Philippines  0.00 
Indonesia  0.00 
Singapore  2.96 
Korea  0.08 
Malaysia  0.10 
Thailand  0.18 
Philippines  0.16 
Indonesia  0.24 
Singapore  0.60 
Korea  0.37 
Malaysia  0.28 
Thailand  0.09 
Philippines  0.18 

























Taxes on Foreign Trade-Other 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.00  0.00  0.01  0.03 
0.02  0.01  0.04  0.13 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Social Security Contribution 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.19  0.20  0.21  0.23 
0.13  0.14  0.14  0.14 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Taxes on Wealth and Property 
3.05  3.29  3.51  3.53 
0.15  0.17  0.16  0.13 
0.14  0.15  0.14  0.12 
0.17  0.19  0.20  0.21 
0.10  0.10  0.09  0.09 
0.19  0.18  0.19  0.21 
Other Taxes 
0.83  0.86  0.79  0.81 
0.47  0.50  0.51  0.55 
0.37  0.41  0.45  0.46 
0.08  0.09  0.10  0.11 
0.21  0.21  0.20  0.19 









































































Source: Fiscal Affairs Department data base, International Monetary Fund. 
of various individual income surtaxes, such as a 5 percent development tax on 
professional, business, and rental income, as well as a 5 percent excess profits 
tax, individual income tax in relation to GDP has also declined. Thus, other 
smaller tax sources and petroleum revenue have  increased relative to GDP. 
Malaysia has been  studying the possibility  of  introducing a VAT  at  some 
point. But no decision has yet been made in this direction. 
Selected Aspects 
In  1986, a 1968 law on tax incentives was replaced by the Promotion of 
Investment Act on the grounds that the earlier system was difficult to admin- 
ister,  favored capital-intensive and  large projects,  was  too  generous,  and 
granted unnecessary protection to domestic industry. However, the incentives 48  Vito Tanzi and Parthasarathi Shome 
do not appear to have been greater than those granted by the NICs. The revised 
Malaysian act itself, as well as the Malaysia Institute of Economic Research 
(MIER) tax reform proposals, does not really attempt to reduce the role of tax 
incentives; MIER, for example, recommends  their extension to the service 
sector and high-risk projects, as well as the widening of their range. 
More than the complexity of the incentives themselves, the impact of petro- 
leum as a source of revenue and  a lack of  resolve  toward fundamental tax 
reform were the primary factors that relegated taxation to a secondary role in 
Malaysia’s development. 
Tax Reform 
In the future, Malaysia will need to undergo major tax reform. To buttress 
its future development, it will need to raise substantial additional tax revenue 
to match its high expenditure needs-for  renewed capital expenditure, as well 
as for maintenance and building infrastructure.  These needs have been con- 
tained in past years to reduce the large fiscal defi~it.~  The practice of  piece- 
meal tax changes to meet immediate revenue needs will have to be replaced 
by more structural tax reform. 
If Malaysia’s experience has demonstrated that it is best to avoid a tax struc- 
ture made complex by multiple objectives, it should aim at a simpler system. 
If  its system of tax incentives has not worked in the past, it is unlikely that it 
will work in the future. Instead, it could strive to broaden the base of its sales 
tax, which already operates on a limited value-added basis. It could consider 
imposing a property tax  such as in Singapore, or introducing  taxes on land 
speculation such as in Taiwan and as proposed in Korea. It should also aim at 
improvements in the administration of income taxes, together with a broad- 
ening of the income tax base. 
2.2.6  Indonesia 
Much has been written on Indonesia’s pre-and  post-tax  reform experiences 
(Booth and McCawley  1981, Asher  1989, and Gillis  1990, among others). 
Here we endeavor to examine the nature of arguments as to why the simplifi- 
cation of Indonesia’s tax system is considered successful. In this section, the 
background for the  need  for the whole reform effort is considered.  Subse- 
quently, the nature as well as the results of the reform is assessed. 
Structural Characteristics 
Indonesia is the second oil exporter in our sample. Like Malaysia,  its tax 
system lingered in the shadow of  revenues from petroleum and gas till  1985 
when Indonesia began to implement one of  the most comprehensive tax re- 
forms in Asia. The task of reforming the tax system was difficult because the 
9. Thus, Asher, Salih, and Salleh (1990) point out that government expenditure in relation to 
GDP fell from 40  percent in  1981-85  to 31 percent in 1986-90. 49  Taxation and Development in East Asian Countries 
existing system had become extremely complex, while collection was small 
(see table 2.3). Direct taxes were a combination of  royalties, property, and 
income taxes, though they were all treated under the “income tax” nomencla- 
ture for foreign tax credit purposes. Progressive scales applied to  both  the 
personal income tax (5-50  percent) and the corporate income tax (20, 30, and 
45 percent) and  included exemptions and  exclusions that were not  imple- 
mented efficiently. Incentives, comprising tax  holidays  and  investment tax 
credits geared toward regional balance, employment promotion, investment 
in target areas, and the like, abounded. The property tax, dating back to the 
1600s and applicable to both urban and rural areas, was collected mainly from 
the latter and had degenerated to insignificance with ever-growing exemp- 
tions. Consumption taxes comprised a turnover tax, selected excises, and cus- 
toms duties, each accounting for about 1 percent of GDP. The cascading turn- 
overhales tax was subject to rate differentiation (eight rates between 1 and 20 
percent), resulting not only in distortions but also in evasion, and many items 
were also exempted. In addition, the sales tax element in exports required a 
complicated export rebate system. 
There was a widespread belief that tax administration was very poor while 
evasion was widespread. Both evasion and corruption were stimulated by the 
complexity of the tax system. Only a fundamental reform could improve the 
situation. 
A Distinguishing Feature 
The most distinguishing characteristic of Indonesia’s tax system, as in Ma- 
laysia, was its primary dependence on the oil sector for the bulk of its revenue. 
The benefits of the oil sector allowed a high rate of growth combined with low 
inflation rates. Thus, spurred on by  oil revenues, Indonesia’s real annual GDP 
growth as 7-8  percent in the 1970s up to 1982, and inflation was less than 10 
percent except during the  1973 and  1979 oil boom  years. This result was 
achieved despite a “decade of  neglect” of physical infrastructurelo  and in the 
presence of a ratio of nonoil revenue to GDP in the 7-8  percent range through- 
out the period (see Gillis 1990, table  1). This low ratio was justified in  the 
hope that oil prices would continue to remain strong. Eventually, and as a 
result of the fall in oil prices in the early 1980s, the authorities came to believe 
that the excessive dependence on the oil sector should be reduced. 
Fundamental Tax Reform 
Once Indonesia decided to undertake fundamental tax reform, it made large 
strides in  that  direction. The changes made were comprehensive and well 
planned: the necessary laws were passed in  1983; a unified personal and cor- 
porate income tax was introduced in 1984 at rates of  15, 25, and 35 percent; a 
10.  The problem of  low expenditure for operation and maintenance remains significant (see 
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uniform 10 percent VAT (coupled with higher luxury taxes) was introduced in 
1985; and  a new property  tax aimed  at urban  real estate was introduced  in 
1986. Income tax-based  incentives were abolished. 
Indonesia's tax reform experience was clearly influenced by,  and in turn it 
influenced, current world thinking. It was aimed at producing a much simpli- 
fied system.  Such a system would be neutral, that is, as nondistortionary as 
possible (few and low tax rates with no special incentives); equitable (taxation 
of urban property and luxuries pari passu, leaving low-income households out 
of  the tax); and revenue-generating (though initially  it was revenue-neutral, 
revenue was expected to rise rapidly from the broader tax base). However, the 
reform was less successful with respect  to import duties. This is a problem 
that Indonesia will have to face during its next development  phase as it at- 
tempts to modernize its industries while exposing them to adequate interna- 
tional competition. 
It is generally accepted that Indonesia's  tax reform has been successful in 
certain respects at least. First, it has reduced distortions caused by the previ- 
ous tax  structure.  Second, its  1983-85  sales tax revenue of  1.5 percent  of 
GDP has been doubled to 3 percent from the VAT (see table 2.3) in  1986-88, 
while excise revenue has been maintained. Third, administrative reform was 
a major objective in which initial gains seem to have been made. 
2.2.7  Thailand 
The last two countries in our sample-Thailand  and the Philippines-are 
neither NICs nor oil exporters." Within a decade, Thailand has increased its 
tax/GDP ratio by more than 2 percentage points of GDP. On the other hand, 
the tax/GDP ratio of  the Philippines has stagnated in  spite of  that country's 
great need for revenue. 
Structural Characteristics 
Thailand has been a high-growth, low-inflation economy. It has undergone 
rapid economic transformation, as agriculture's share in GDP has been shrink- 
ing rapidly,'* and as export promotion has replaced  import substitution as a 
development  strategy. However, Thailand's  tax system has lacked the trans- 
parence that is needed to achieve specific objectives. If  anything, it has been 
an obstacle to the achievement of those objectives. 
The tax structure itself is complex. It has been characterized by  base ero- 
sion resulting  from many  special allowances  and  high  standard deductions 
(allowed for different sources of income) and by the failure to tax fringe ben- 
efits.  Also, there are many  nonneutralities in the tax treatment of  different 
income sources on different transactions. In the corporate income tax, the dif- 
ferential tax treatment of interest and dividends has led to a bias in favor of 
11.  Given the high growth rate in Thailand in recent years, it may soon establish a claim to be 
12.  For a treatment of  sectoral changes in GDP, see Richupan (1990). 
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debt financing,  while  asset revaluation  formulas, loss carry-forward  provi- 
sions, and the like do not appear to be internationally competitive. 
Selected Distinguishing Features 
Heavy Reliance on Domestic Consumption Taxes. Table 2.3 shows that Thai- 
land  has historically  depended heavily  on domestic consumption  taxes and 
continues to do so-obtaining  more than half of its tax revenue from a cascad- 
ing business tax, applied with differentiated and high rates, and from a large 
number of excises (table 2.1). Customs duties and income taxes yield above a 
fifth each. Customs tariffs are also very complex, providing a wide range of 
effective protection to some domestic industries. The overall system of busi- 
ness  tax,  excises,  and  customs tariff has  formed a  complex, distortionary 
wedge into the production structure of the economy. 
The Role of  Tax Incentives. Thailand’s Board of  Investment played a major 
role in the allocation of the nation’s productive resources by encouraging spe- 
cific sectors and discouraging others through the tax system. The high degree 
of discretion and selectivity in the granting of  incentives for a wide range of 
objectives, accompanied by little monitoring or follow-up of promoted enter- 
prises, paralleled the experience of Indonesia and the Philippines. Indonesia’s 
solution was  to abolish tax  incentives altogether. Thailand, like the  Philip- 
pines, does not appear to have come to that solution. 
To conclude, Thailand’s tax structure is likely to have generated production 
distortions, with an adverse impact on production  patterns and levels. This 
has been especially true of its business tax. In this sense, it may have sacri- 
ficed some of its potential growth over the years. However, its incentives re- 
gime, while complex and distortionary in conception, was even more deficient 
in implementation. 
Tax Reform 
Like Malaysia, Thailand has tinkered  with  its tax  system over the years 
without any major policy reform. In  1989, it introduced further tax changes 
aimed at simplification, neutrality,  and revenue generation.  The personal in- 
come tax brackets were reduced from eleven to six, while the top rate remains 
at 55 percent. Also, a greater number of low-income taxpayers were left out 
of the income tax net. But, to address the revenue objective, a further sched- 
ular aspect was introduced with a withholding tax of  15 percent on dividend 
income. Not much has been done, however, to reduce expense deductions and 
allowances from business incomes. 
The major tax reform under consideration by  Thailand is the introduction 
of  a 10 percent VAT to replace the current complex and inefficient business 
tax with twenty-one rates ranging from 0.10 to 50 percent. While several ser- 
vice activities and agricultural products would be left out of the tax net, this 52  Vito Tanzi and Parthasarathi Shome 
would be a change in the right direction that can only benefit production and 
growth. While the combined changes in the system of excises and the business 
tax  are to be revenue-neutral,  the expectation  is that  the broad-based  VAT 
would be revenue-enhancing  in the medium term. Thailand has been getting 
ready for the introduction of the VAT.  Much of the preparatory work has been 
done, and an intense campaign to instruct  taxpayers  has been  carried  out. 
However, it appears that some political hurdles must be overcome for the VAT 
to be introduced in Thailand. 
Thailand will need to focus on reducing the wide dispersion of its nominal 
tariffs-thirty-four  rates ranging between  1 and 200 percent-and  the exces- 
sive rates of effective protection if it wishes to modernize its industrial sector. 
There is much discussion on this issue and many studies. The next step would 
be to place it firmly on the tax reform agenda. As in Taiwan and Korea, its 
current balance-of-payment  situation does not justify the continuation of ob- 
stacles to import. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that there have been major improvements in 
tax administration in recent years. In this sense, the experience of Thailand is 
different  from that of  the Philippines, with the public  finances  of Thailand 
having  improved  considerably  in  recent  years.  These improvements  have 
made possible the rise in the tax/GDP ratio and have thus insured that at least 
the revenue objective was satisfied. 
2.2.8  The Philippines 
In our discussion of East Asian economies, placing the Philippines at the 
very end has a certain purpose: it has lagged behind in economic development 
and has had  little success in applying  fiscal instruments-both  tax  and ex- 
penditure-to  promote its development needs. Furthermore, the quality of  its 
tax administration has been particularly disappointing. 
Structural Characteristics 
The Philippines’ shares of various taxes in total tax revenue parallel those 
of Thailand. However, while there has been a steady-though  slow-increase 
in Thailand’s tax/GDP ratio over the last decade, the Philippines’ tax ratio has 
not increased beyond the low level of  11 percent (table 2.3), which occurred 
during  a  period  when expenditure increases  were  significant.  The conse- 
quence was a continuous fiscal crisis. Despite the recognition, in a number of 
studies and reports since the mid-I970s, of  a need for major tax reform, the 
period through the first half of the 1980s witnessed only minor ad hoc changes 
in the tax system. 
Changes  in  excises-especially  in  petroleum  products-sales  tax,  and 
trade taxes were among the minor ad hoc revisions made. These changes made 
the system more  complex and the  administration  more  unwieldy.  For  ex- 
ample, domestic consumption was taxed by a “manufacturers’ sales tax” on a 
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ual services were taxed at differing rates; “fixed and graduated fixed taxes” on 
sales establishments, with rates varying according to business; and variously 
rated sales taxes on  imports of  domestic consumption goods that were de- 
signed to selectively provide protection to domestic production. 
Income taxes also went through various revisions. For example, in 1981 the 
tax base was changed from net to gross income, and separate rates and exemp- 
tions were applied to different sources of income. These changes had the ob- 
jective  of  improving  revenue  performance  through  easier  administration. 
However, their impact on revenue was disappointing. Table 2.3 reveals that 
the income tax/GDP ratio as well as the individual income tax/GDP ratio both 
declined steadily in the post-1981 period. The same occurred to other taxes 
during the first half of the 1980s. This should not be surprising, since fiscal 
incentives-incorporating  a basic  1968 legislation-covered  a wide variety 
of objectives such as import substitution, labor-intensive production, and a 
well-ranked set-pioneer,  nonpioneer (but preferred), and others-of  indus- 
trial as well as export promotion. Further, instruments used were not just in- 
come taxes, but domestic sales taxes as well as customs tariffs. 
Selected Distinguishing Features 
Behind the stagnancy in the Philippines’ tax effort lies a decline in its tax/ 
GDP ratio between 1978 and 1985, and then a steady rise back to the initial 
level by  1988. The decline followed by  the rise is reflected across domestic 
consumption and  income taxes,  though  not  trade taxes.  Within these tax 
groups, the composition has changed: thus general sales taxes have remained 
at a much lower level than in the 1978-80  era, as has the individual income 
tax, whose fall has been countered to some extent by selective excises and by 
the corporate income tax. But the overall pattern that emerges is that, while 
up to the mid-1980s the tax system had ceased to be buoyant, in the second 
half of the decade it began to respond somewhat to the reform actions. How- 
ever, the effort barely brought the tax/GDP ratio back to the level at the begin- 
ning of the 1980s. 
Despite the large number of studies by  international agencies and national 
bodies, there has been limited action by  the authorities to implement serious 
tax reform. Administrative improvements have also been lacking. The author- 
ities have made frequent use of tax amnesties. Between 1972 and  1981, ten 
amnesties were declared, yielding substantial revenues and, in effect, validat- 
ing the failure in tax  administration. The  1983-84  economic crisis spurred 
some action on reforming the tax system and on improving its tax administra- 
tion. 
Tin Reform 
Tax  reform in the Philippines became a major concern after the  1983-84 
economic crisis. That concern accelerated with the  1986 change in govern- 
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modifications to the tax structure to simplify it, make it more neutral, broaden 
its base, and raise additional revenue.  Several tax measures became effective 
beginning in 1988. 
A  uniform  10 percent,  consumption-based  VAT  was  adopted.  Capital 
equipment, agricultural  inputs, and small businesses are exempt, while cer- 
tain services such as hotels and insurance are taxed outside the VAT  system. 
However, the performance of  the VAT has not been too encouraging, and its 
revenue  in relation  to GDP has registered  little increase  over the pre-VAT 
years. One reason that has been cited is lack of administrative preparation and 
poor implementation  (Sicat  1990). Unlike Indonesia  and Korea, where  ad- 
ministrative aspects received careful attention and the revenue response was 
far more positive, in the Philippines administrative aspects have continued to 
receive inadequate attention. The excises-mainly  tobacco, alcohol, and en- 
ergy products-have  scored better in revenue response. 
The Philippines abolished all export taxes-on  copper concentrates, sugar, 
copra, and coconut oil-except  those on logs and lumber. While highly desir- 
able from an efficiency and, perhaps, equity perspective, this change led to a 
loss of  a steady source of revenue that the country  was not able to replace 
easily with alternate sources.  The schedular income tax  system was contin- 
ued, while the number of individual income tax rates was reduced and the top 
rate  was  halved  to  35  percent.  The base  was  broadened  to  a  “modified 
gross”-from  the earlier “net”-base  system. The top individual and the cor- 
porate income tax rates were aligned. 
So far the revenue response to these changes has been marginal. This had 
been expected for the individual income tax-a  result exacerbated by the tax 
exemption of dividend income from 1989-but  not for the corporate income 
tax. For the latter, it had been assumed that tax evasion would be reduced as a 
result of  the introduction of a single corporate tax rate. The tax incentive sys- 
tem was again tinkered with and, possibly, made more ample and unnecessary 
(Sicat 1990). Finally, a tax amnesty was declared (in 1986), yielding about 3 
percent of income tax revenue. 
To conclude, the Philippines has introduced various tax reform measures in 
the late  1980s, comprising income and consumption  taxes.  Yet  the revenue 
response has so far not been significant. Clearly, the Philippines is one case in 
which taxation will be ineffective unless major administrative improvements 
are made. 
2.3  Lessons and Conclusions 
We have discussed some important features of the tax systems of eight East 
Asian economies. These eight countries include  some very  successful eco- 
nomic performers-Hong  Kong, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan,  and Thailand; 
some adequate performers-Indonesia  and Malaysia;  and one that  has had 
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namely the Philippines. This characterization is made on the basis of growth 
rates, rates of  inflation, balance-of-payments performances, and whether ex- 
ternal debt became a major problem. 
The question that must be asked now  is whether there are any lessons or 
general conclusions that could be drawn from the experiences of these econo- 
mies. We  will discuss separately conclusions relating to economic perform- 
ance in general and conclusions derived from the earlier discussion of the tax 
systems. 
2.3.1  Lessons from Economic Performances 
Tax policy is only one element of the general economic policy pursued by a 
country. Other policies, such as fiscal policy in a broader sense, monetary 
policy, exchange rate policy,  price policy,  and the various regulations that 
often greatly influence the allocation of resources, are equally important. It is 
thus difficult to isolate the effect of tax policy from that of  the other policies 
or to attribute to it economic successes or failures. The countries that per- 
formed well generally pursued good policy on many fronts. They did not al- 
low the real exchange rate to become overvalued, they did not allow large and 
difficult-to-finance fiscal deficits to arise, and they pursued monetary policies 
that kept inflation under control and real interest rates positive. In fact, in 
some of these countries, tax policy would not have deserved particularly high 
marks if assessed in isolation. 
By  and large,  the successful countries avoided difficulties with  external 
debt. They did not borrow to finance consumption or unproductive investment 
as happened in some other Asian countries (see Tanzi  1987) and in too many 
countries elsewhere in the world. In Korea and Thailand, the growing size of 
the external debt became a concern in the early 1980s, and both countries took 
steps to bring down their ratio of external debt to GDP. In Malaysia, the exter- 
nal debt became a greater concern, having reached a very high ratio of GDP. 
In  more recent years this country has also been  attempting to control that 
problem. In the Philippines, however, the external debt has continued to grow, 
creating major difficulties for policymakers. In Indonesia, the external debt 
has been a continuous concern, although it has not created the same difficul- 
ties as in the Philippines. 
In all of these successful countries, the government has played a major role. 
Therefore, the hypothesis advanced by some writers, that the success of some 
of  these countries was  due to the insignificant role of  the public sector, is 
simply not correct. What is important is that the government’s role was lim- 
ited to its traditional functions, namely, the provision of social and economic 
infrastructure, the maintenance of a stable economic framework, and the pro- 
motion of growth. The signal that the government gave over the years was that 
increasing the size of the economy, especially through the stimulation of  ex- 
ports, was more important than the redistribution of  income or the achieve- 
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public finance experts sometimes call “exhaustive”-in  other words, it di- 
rectly used goods and services. Education, in particular,  received a lot of at- 
tention. In this area, these countries outspent most other developing countries. 
Furthermore, education was oriented toward technical fields. The proportion 
of  transfers in total expenditure was kept small. The role of social security in 
these countries, with the exception of Singapore, was limited.  And welfare 
transfers were almost nonexistent. Government jobs were generally well paid 
and carried prestige. Public employees were a powerful group. Clientelism 
and unemployment  reduction  did not play any  significant  role in the selec- 
tion and hiring of government employees. 
In summary, the public sectors in the successful East Asian countries were 
consistent with the view that public sectors should be small but efficient. In 
the less successful countries of the sample, some of the above conditions did 
not exist. 
2.3.2  Lessons from the Tax Systems 
A few lessons can be derived from the analysis of the tax systems of  the 
sample countries. First, the importance of the structure of taxation is directly 
related to the stability of the macroeconomic framework. The more stable the 
macroeconomic  framework, the more important  becomes  the tax structure. 
The tax structure may become largely irrelevant when macroeconomic prob- 
lems become predominant, and the distortions created by the tax system be- 
come of a second order of magnitude. In these situations, it may be preferable 
to raise the level of taxes through  “bad” taxes, in order to reduce the fiscal 
deficit, than to continue with a low-yielding but “good” tax system that does 
not generate sufficient revenue to cover expenditure. This conclusion rests on 
the assumption that raising revenue will necessarily help correct the macro- 
economic imbalance by reducing the size of  the fiscal deficit.  It also implies 
that a poor tax structure is not itself a major contributor to the macroeconomic 
problems.  However, a country that,  for example, attempted to raise a large 
share of total tax revenue from export taxes might be contributing to its own 
macroeconomic difficulties by discouraging exports. 
Second, there seems to be little relationship between fiscal disequilibrium 
and the level of  taxation. The country with the highest level of  taxation (Ma- 
laysia) was also the one with the highest fiscal deficit. On the other hand, the 
two countries with the lowest level of taxation  (Hong Kong and the Philip- 
pines)  included  one of  the  best  and  the worst economic  performers  in the 
group. In this connection it may also be important to ask what countries at- 
tempt to achieve with the resources they collect from higher levels of taxation. 
Why do countries aim for widely different tax levels and expenditure levels? 
In Malaysia, for example, the level of public spending reached 40 percent of 
GDP in the early 1980s, while in several of  the other countries it was one- 
third or half that level. Why did Malaysia feel the necessity to bring its public 
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there specific objectives  (literacy,  life expectancy, employment, a better in- 
come distribution)  that  Malaysia was trying  to achieve? Was  it  successful? 
The experience from developing countries in general also indicates that rais- 
ing taxes, without controlling nonproductive public spending, often leads to 
disappointing results. 
Third, no clear pattern of tax policy appears among the five most successful 
countries. None had particularly high tax ratios, and two of them, Singapore 
and Taiwan, made good use of property taxation, a distinctive feature of these 
countries. In fact, there is no comparable experience in the developing world. 
Korea is  contemplating following  this  experience  by  introducing  property 
taxes to discourage speculative investment in land.  The reliance On  income 
taxes was also varied. Some countries had very low income tax rates on both 
individuals  and enterprises, but others did  not.  In general income tax rates 
were not particularly low in these countries, except in Hong Kong. 
Hong Kong is the classic example of a Reagan-type supply-side economy. 
It has a small but highly efficient government that has given no role to govern- 
ment bureaucrats in the selection of investments, a decision left essentially to 
market forces, and has used low tax rates applied to broad bases. Thus, Hong 
Kong went for the leveling of the playing field long before such an approach 
became fashionable. In fact, the Hong Kong experience inspired some of the 
early and influential writers on supply-side economics. Furthermore, the tax 
environment  for investors and decision  makers in general was quite stable, 
since tax rates were kept essentially unchanged over decades and the structure 
of  taxation was left intact over many years. Thus, the playing  field was not 
just leveled  across investments  at one moment  of  time but  also over time. 
These low rates were assumed to stimulate high savings and to encourage the 
use of  that saving in the most productive activities. The country did not dis- 
criminate between domestic and foreign investment. The government saw its 
role as that of providing a low-cost and stable environment for potential inves- 
tors, whether domestic or foreign.  This attitude left no role for explicit tax 
incentives.  Given the  transparency  of  the tax  system, it probably  also left 
little,  if  any,  role for rent-seeking  activities.  One would  assume that  Hong 
Kong would provide a good model for other countries to imitate. In fact, it 
has often been considered by supply-siders as the ideal model. 
The problem with the above conclusion, however, is that Taiwan followed 
a very different strategy but achieved similar results. Taiwanese policymakers 
believed  that  they  could  pursue  an  investment  strategy that  would  second- 
guess the market  and pick winners.  As  a consequence, Taiwan kept its tax 
rates much higher than Hong Kong but pushed the investors in the desired 
direction through the widespread use of tax incentives. These incentives were 
fine-tuned to a degree rarely seen in other countries. Through tax incentives 
the government tried to encourage exports as well as investment in high tech- 
nology industries.  At the same time it tried to discourage investment in “un- 
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This strategy is a challenge to the kind of  supply-side economics identified 
with Hong Kong. 
On the basis of  the experience of  many developing countries, many  tax 
experts are now strongly opposed to the use of tax incentives. These are seen 
to breed corruption and rent-seeking activities and to negatively affect the 
quality of  the tax system. And often they are also seen to be ineffective. Yet 
Taiwan has grown at a very high rate and has promoted high technology in- 
dustries presumably through the use of tax incentives.13  And, to a large extent, 
Korea and Singapore have done the same. Was  there something peculiar to 
these countries that made possible for them the productive use of instruments 
that are largely discredited and ineffective in other countries? 
One possible answer is that the effectiveness of the tax incentives may de- 
pend less on their own characteristics than on the characteristics of the coun- 
tries where they are used. In countries where the public bureaucracy is made 
up of  a well-paid, well-trained, powerful, and respected elite and where the 
population is highly homogeneous and deeply committed to achieving partic- 
ular social goals, the use of tax incentives will not lead to the same detrimental 
influences often found in other countries. Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan are 
clear examples of the former type of countries. There is no doubt that they are 
highly homogeneous and that their civil servants represent a powerful and 
efficient elite.  In  these countries, civil servants can use the incentives and 
other policy instruments to push economic decisions in directions that give 
more weight to longer-term results than to immediate results and  that may 
generate important externalities that facilitate the growth process. In  other 
words, the decision-making process of the public bureaucracy may be guided 
by a lower, implicit, discount rate than the one that guides the private sector. 
Private enterprises are likely to make economic decisions on the basis of 
current relative prices and factor availability. In other words, they tend to fo- 
cus on immediate and private profits. Or, putting it differently, they make de- 
cisions on the basis of a static concept of comparative advantage or efficiency. 
However, a dynamic society, especially at an earlier stage of development than 
industrial countries, might be able to pursue policies aimed at changing the 
current comparative advantage and at exploiting externalities. This line of ar- 
gument has been developed recently by Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989), 
Romer (1989), and others. Government bureaucrats might believe that, with 
proper policies, including tax incentives, costs of production can be reduced 
by  increasing the factors of production that are now scarce. This is a kind of 
infant industry argument, but applied to the whole society rather than to a 
specific firm. 
For example, if  the incentive legislation favors technologically advanced 
activities, this (1)  will signal to the investors that the government will generate 
13. Of  course, an open question is what would have happened in the absence of  those tax 
incentives. 59  Taxation and Development in East Asian Countries 
a desirable habitat in those activities in more ways than just through tax incen- 
tives,14 (2) will stimulate investors to search for and acquire the relevant tech- 
nology, and (3) will signal to individuals that education in technical fields will 
be well compensated.I5 In other words, the tax incentives may have a kind of 
announcement effect that, in time, will change the comparative advantage of 
the country. 
Let us  outline a bit  more precisely  the role of  tax  incentives and related 
government policies  in Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. This role can be as- 
sessed in the spirit of  recent growth theories.  The starting point must be the 
identification of a precise and broadly shared goal of economic policy. In these 
countries that goal was undoubtedly the stimulation of  technologically based 
export industries.  The promotion  of  that  goal  was pursued  through  educa- 
tional expenditure and the provision of incentives.  A sound macroeconomic 
framework was the essential background. A facilitating factor was a relatively 
good initial  income distribution,  which  at least  for a while reduced  social 
tensions while at the same time enlarging the size of the domestic market for 
the goods produced. 
As already mentioned, public expenditure for education was much higher 
in these countries than in the majority of developing countries, and education 
put a lot of emphasis on technological fields, especially on engineering. The 
brightest students could also get scholarships to do advanced work in foreign 
schools, especially in foreign engineering schools. The effectiveness of  edu- 
cational spending by the public sector was enhanced by the attitudes of par- 
ents. The latter came to believe that the road to success for their children was 
through  education. This promoted  an extraordinary  competition  among the 
students to get into good schools. Hard scholastic work became the norm. 
The widespread technical knowledge among the population created a fertile 
ground for the transfer of technology from more advanced countries.  It also 
created a fertile ground for the diffusion of that technology within the country. 
Having started far behind the industrial countries, these countries did not have 
to generate new technologies themselves but could go a long way by adopting 
(often with important modifications) technologies that were easily available in 
advanced  countries. They started  with  simpler  technologies  (i.e.,  textiles, 
shipbuilding, steel) and progressively moved toward more sophisticated ones 
(electronics, computers).  l6 
While education  created the ground for the absorption of  these technolo- 
14. This may signal that that particular habitat will benefit from credit availability, provision of 
relevant information, and favorable regulations. Furthermore, educational expenditure of the right 
kind can make that habitat more attractive. 
15.  This may explain why American engineering schools have been very popular with students 
from these countries. 
16. To quote from Romer (1990, i, 10):  “Technological advances generate benefits that are at 
least partially excludable. . . . This means that . . . nonconvexities matter for growth . . . [and] 
matter for aggregate level analysis . . . there are large dynamic gains from trade between similar 
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gies, tax and credit incentives were used to guide investment by specific firms 
toward  particular  areas. The assumption  was that these  were the areas that 
provided the best chances for future exports. In part the incentives may have 
compensated the specific firms that benefited from them for the positive exter- 
nalities that they generated by being the pioneers in some areas. The diffusion 
of technology may also have been facilitated (especially in Korea) by the fi- 
nancial relations among enterprises (i.e., by the conglomerates). 
2.4  Concluding Remarks 
In the previous section, we have discussed the (probably) beneficial effects 
of incentives in Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. It must be reiterated and em- 
phasized that these were rather unusual experiences. The beneficial effects of 
incentives will not take place if incompetence,  corruption, or various forms 
of rent-seeking activities become important. In such cases, incentive legisla- 
tion, especially if based on discretionary decisions, will provide a perfect in- 
strument for enriching some bureaucrats and for permitting some investors to 
evade paying  taxes. The loser would be  the public  interest.  Therefore, the 
experience of our successful countries is not necessarily transferable to other 
countries.  Even in our successful countries, these incentives will eventually 
outlive their usefulness.  It will become progressively more difficult to pick up 
winning industries as these countries develop. Furthermore,  if the tax incen- 
tives are successful, they will make some individuals very rich. If these indi- 
viduals adjust their consumption standards in line with their incomes,  social 
inequities will become apparent and social tension will rise. This will bring to 
the forefront the objective of a fair income distribution (see Murphy, Shleifer, 
and Vishny  1988). The tax system will be seen as an instrument that can be 
used to achieve this objective. Tax reform should then be aimed at reducing 
conspicuous  spending  and high  incomes. Wealth taxes  and more  equitable 
income taxes can be efficient instruments to achieve these objectives. 
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Comment  Joseph Y.  Lim 
The paper is a nice summary of the tax policies, experiences, problems, and 
future prospects and directions of tax reforms in East Asian countries. I partic- 
ularly like the section on the lessons that can be learned from these countries, 
and I  will  concentrate my  comments on this part  later.  However,  there  is 
hardly any discussion on the effects of tax policies of East Asian countries on 
one another, or their interdependence.  This is particularly true for the ASEAN 
countries, since these countries are mainly competitors with respect to exports 
and foreign investments and they are increasingly dependent on trade relations 
and foreign investments from Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and Singapore. Yet they 
desire regional coordination and cooperation. Therefore there is a need to ask 
if there is room for regional harmonization or mutual cooperation in tax poli- 
cies. This important aspect seems to have been left out in the paper. 
Having said this, let me turn the discussion on the lessons learned from the 
experience of  East Asian countries. What I will say will just be additions to 
what  was  said by  Vito Tanzi and Parthasarathi  Shome. In  a way it tries to 
explain why countries  with very different fiscal policies may  succeed in an 
export-oriented path and is also a sort of apology as to why the Philippines is 
the basket case in the paper’s list of countries. In another sense, this is not 
really an apology, since I will be quite harsh on the Philippines. 
At this conference John Whalley posed the question of how issues on tax 
policies and reforms qualitatively differ between a developed and a developing 
economy. From the Philippine point of view, this is a very important question 
indeed. To  answer it, we will have to go deeply into the heart of  political 
economy-a  most relevant topic for our conference. 
It is fortunate that in public finance, especially in recent times, the literature 
has taken into consideration the hard realities-particularly  the importance of 
the government, the nature of the state, and implicitly the level of social cohe- 
sion of the country being analyzed-in  tackling fiscal problems. 
I remember the old days when I was an undergraduate taking up my basic 
economic course; fiscal policies were important, not only because they had 
some effects  on the multiplier,  but  also because  all questions pertaining  to 
equity were regulated to the fiscal solution. I simply imagined the Philippine 
state and was puzzled how this could be done. Would the powerful landlords 
and monopolists  in the executive, legislative,  and judicial branches miracu- 
lously tax themselves and provide transfer payments to the poor and needy? 
Surely the realities of our neighbors in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea have 
shown that wealth and income redistribution of a backward society like ours 
was most effectively  tackled through  a radical agrarian reform, high invest- 
ments in human  capital  and education, and other structural transformations 
rather than through fiscal policies of a rent-seeking state. 
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Most recently we Filipinos again have been told by textbooks-by  way of 
some pseudo-supply-side arguments-that  low tax rates or tax incentives and 
tax credit should be given to foreign investments without any consideration to 
the government’s responsibility of providing economic and political stability, 
proper infrastructure, and profitable environment to the investors. Indeed we 
have given four-to-six-year tax holidays, enormous tax credits (many are dis- 
tortionary since they exempt capital goods importation in a labor-abundant 
economy),  and  even  subsidized foreign investments through  the  debt-to- 
equity swap scheme (which converted debt papers to equity investments at a 
50% discount). Our incentive scheme for foreign investments is (especially if 
you include the debt-to-equity swap) better than other ASEAN countries. But 
the foreign investment did not come in a massive scale as it did to our ASEAN 
neighbors. Much of foreign investment that came in 1986-88 was due to debt- 
to-equity swaps. Some that came in were fly-by-night investments or invest- 
ments running away from regulatory restrictions (e.g.,  strict environmental 
laws) from other countries. The Philippines lost at least $4 billion of annual 
revenues from investments that would have come in anyway (the attractive 
debt-to-equity arrangement saw to it) at a time when we faced extreme fiscal 
constraint wherein almost 50% of the budget was and is going to debt service 
(two-thirds of  which is domestic debt servicing and the rest foreign debt ser- 
vicing). 
Again we were taught by the textbooks and by the International Monetary 
Fund and World Bank to practically abolish restrictions on capital outflow as 
part of  the liberalization process, and we did so in the early 80s. But as the 
paper of  Assaf Razin and Efraim Sadka reminds us, this was done without 
consideration of the country’s capability to tax its citizens and firms abroad or 
to run after runaway capital. So that when economic and political crisis struck 
in the second half  of  1983 (partly caused by  the assassination of  Benign0 
Aquino), much evidence showed that capital flight was indeed facilitated by 
the above scheme. 
The Philippines has also done everything a good “boy” should do in the 








a movement from schedular to global income taxation, 
a unification of withholding taxes on interest income and royalties, 
an elimination of withholding tax on dividends, 
unification of corporate income tax at 35%, 
initiation  of  value-added  taxation  to  replace  the  cumbersome  sales- 
turnover tax, 
abolition of export taxes except on logs, and 
supposed general revision of valuation of real property for tax purposes. 
Most of the above (except 3 and 6) were done partly with the goal of  in- 
creasing government revenue. But now  about four years later, our tax/GDP 
ratio is back only to the prerecession level of the early 1980s, which is around 
12%-the  lowest in the whole ASEAN region. Because of  this poor fiscal 64  Vito Tanzi and Parthasarathi Shome 
showing, Congress has just legislated more taxes on “sin” products (e.g., al- 
cohol and cigarettes).  The cabinet has proposed a tax package  containing a 
supposedly progressive scheme on additional taxation of property and nones- 
sentials. The Speaker of the House of Representatives, who (perhaps until this 
week) is the leading presidential candidate in 1992 representing Aquino’s rul- 
ing party, opposed the scheme, stating “The rich have to be protected.” 
Now the IMF is asking us to cut our budget deficit. If we cannot increase 
tax revenues significantly, which is certain, we will have to cut back on our 
government expenditures-particularly  capital outlays-at  a time when the 
country’s infrastructure is deteriorating and the economy is racked by a peren- 
nial power shortage. 
All of  these are related to Tanzi’s and Shome’s point about the importance 
of the government and why countries with opposite policies-one  using the 
nonintervention  approach (Hong Kong) and others more interventionist  (Tai- 
wan, Korea, Singapore)-can  all succeed due to the existence of (what I call 
a) “good” government,  i.e.,  a forward- and  long-term-looking,  stable, and 
continuing government with a broad professional  bureaucracy  serious about 
attaining a national goal. The Philippines is the other side of the coin; it had a 
“bad’ government epitomized by the Marcos government, which bred corrup- 
tion and rent seeking (in tax administration,  among other areas), combined 
with various inefficiencies and ineptitude in the bureaucracy. Many critics of 
Aquino claim that the government has not yet changed. Even the reasonable 
Aquino supporters admit that the political will and the government’s capabil- 
ity to institute radical change is gone. And the social cohesion necessary for a 
successful transformation to be effected without chaos and anarchy is lacking. 
The Aquino government also cannot guarantee that whatever policies in effect 
now will  survive  1992 when  the  Aquino government gives way to its suc- 
cessor. 
Implementing fiscal reforms and, as Tanzi and Shome correctly point out, 
most other economic reforms (trade, industrial, financial) requires a “good” 
government.  This may  even  accommodate  interventionist  policies.  For the 
new developments in institutional economics have shown that if there are mar- 
ket imperfections (high transaction costs or market failures), if there is oppor- 
tunism and asset specificity (to quote Oliver Williamson), then there is need 
for strong governance. A “good” government, therefore, free of rent seeking, 
can indeed use interventionist policies to achieve an economic goal, especially 
if it is supported by the economic agents. 
Cooperative and repeated game theories show that, in a prisoner’s dilemma 
type of situation, cooperation rather than individual optimization may yield a 
higher social utility. Indeed social cohesion and good and responsible govern- 
ment are needed for economic reforms-one  of the most obvious being fiscal 
reform. 
It is important then that when talking about fiscal reforms, a concentration 
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at the institutional factors may  be misleading and even detrimental, as the 
Philippines illustrates. It is high time that economists  descend from cloud nine 
and accept that which every man in the street already knows-policy  prescrip- 
tions and reforms do not exist in  a vacuum. Perhaps more important may be 
the institutional setting and environment wherein these policies and reforms 
will be undertaken. And I think this is the single most important lesson that 
we should learn from the Tanzi-Shome paper. 